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AUSTRALIAN COMPULSORY
ARBITRATION:
WILL IT SURVIVE INTO THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?Q
By RICHARD

MrCHELL AND RICHARD NAUGHTON**

Over the past decade Australia has struggled to come to grips with the decline
of its traditional economic and industrial structures, and the need to
accommodate itself to the international context. Since 1900 Australia has had
an industrial relations system highly regulated by law. Economic and political
pressures are challenging the continuing relevance of this system, and
particularly its ability to adapt to the need for an "enterprise-based" industrial
relations culture. This article examines the type of industrial relations system
erected under compulsory arbitration in Australia, its impact upon various
aspects of the labour market, and the incremental nature of the process of
reform to the system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the turn of the century, Australia has regulated its
industrial relations through statutory systems of conciliation and
arbitration. Though there are seven separate major systems, those of the
Commonwealth and the six states, until recently the uniformity of
regulation amongst them was quite pronounced. Each was compulsory
in essence, and most provided for a system of union incorporation and
regulation. Inevitably, however, this division of regulatory power made
Australian industrial relations law complex, and the pursuit of a
coherent and unified industrial strategy difficult.
Under the terms of the Australian Constitution,1 the national
government has the power to make laws with respect to conciliation and
arbitration for the settlement of interstate industrial disputes 2 This is a
somewhat limited power. It provides no authority for the national
Parliament to legislate on industrial relations generally, to prescribe
conditions of employment, or to otherwise directly regulate the
employment contract. While there are other constitutional powers
available to the national Parliament whereby some of these objectives
might be secured 3 intervention by federal statute into industrial
1

The Commonwealth ofAustralia ConstitutionAct 1900 63 & 64 Victoria, c. 12 (U.K)-tho
covering Act-was the Act of the Parliament at Westminster, which took effect from 1901 and
established Australia as a federal nation-state. The Australian Constitution, all 128 sections of it,
comprises section 9 of the covering Act just referred to. All future references to the Australian
Constitutionrefer to the document that forms section 9 of the covering Act.
2

Australian Constitution, s. 51(xxxv).

3 There has been some imaginative use made of constitutional powers other than s. 51 (xxxv) in
recent times. During 1992 various legislative provisions were inserted into the federal legislation,
which allow the Industrial Relations Commission to review unfair contracts made with independent
contractors. These provisions depend for their validity upon the corporations' power (Australian
Constitution, s. 51(xx)). In December 1992 the national Labor government announced plans to
establish minimum standards in areas of redundancy, equal pay, and unfair dismissal for all
Australian employees. The proposed legislation will rely upon the external affairs power (Australian
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relations has been largely confined to erecting machinery for conciliation
and arbitration. On the other hand, the legislative powers of state
governments are plenary and are held concurrently with national
authority. All states, until recently, have chosen to exercise their
legislative powers over industrial relations in a way broadly consistent
with the approach of national governments. Conflicts between the laws
of the national Parliament and of the state parliaments are resolved in
favour of federal supremacy. 4
Since the introduction of arbitration, the national system has
emerged as the leading, or pre-eminent institution. The decisions of the
national industrial relations authority, the Australian Industrial
Relations Commission, directly cover only some 33 per cent of the
workforce, compared with almost 50 per cent covered by state
authorities. Until recently, major policy initiatives in industrial relations
have tended to derive from the national authority and to flow into the
state systems in a semi-automatic process. Since the early 1990s,
however, some state parliaments have begun to experiment with
industrial relations systems widely differing from the compulsory
arbitration norm. To understand the processes of industrial relations
and their interrelationship with economic and political matters, we must
nevertheless focus on the federal system. That is the approach adopted
in this paper, although for illustrative purposes we will make some
reference to state systems, and particularly to various state-sponsored
reforms of recent years.
The reasons for the introduction of the compulsory arbitration
systems may be briefly stated. Throughout the nineteenth century, the
economies of the Australian colonies were almost entirely reliant upon
the export of primary commodities. From the 1870s onwards there were
increasing efforts to encourage a domestic economy, but this policy was
given greater prominence in the 1890s as a result of the arrangements
made for the federation of the Australian colonies. The development of
the manufacturing industry depended on a number of factors, one of
which was the stabilization of industrial relations. During the 1890s,
Australia was brought to the point of economic collapse by a series of
major strikes and severe economic depression. Various systems of
voluntary conciliation and arbitration were tried but were completely

Constitution, s. 51 (xxxi)) and the fact that Australia has ratified a number of International Labour
Organisation (o)
4

Conventions, which deal with these matters.

Australian Constitution, s. 109.
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ineffectual in resolving the industrial relations crisis.5 Compulsory
arbitration emerged as the solution. Under this system, unions had to be
recognized and guaranteed some role in the process of industrial
regulation. Also a scheme of tariff protection, based upon the payment
of fair wages, innovations in social legislation-such as workers'
compensation, pensions, housing, and education-and the exclusion of
coloured labour, constituted the remainder of a system of economic
reform.6 Arbitration was, therefore, but one element, albeit an
important one, in a scheme devised to assist in the development of a
strong and independent domestic economy.
II. AUSTRALIAN COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE SYSTEM
The introduction of compulsory arbitration legislation, at the
national and state levels, did not replace existing sources of industrial
law. The system was merely legislatively superimposed upon the existing
network of common law principles, which applied in the industrial
relations context, particularly contracts and torts. It was also,
superimposed upon existing trade union legislation, masters and servants
legislation, factories legislation, and so on. Nevertheless, the new
arbitration statutes quickly established themselves as the principal form
century compulsory
of industrial regulation, and for most of this
7
arbitration characterized Australian labour law.
At this point, it is necessary to set out in brief the elements of the
national system of compulsory arbitration. These are embodied in the
Industial Relations Act8 of 1988. The IRA establishes the Industrial
Relations Commission (IRC), which is the successor to the Court of
Conciliation and Arbitration (1904-1956) and the Conciliation and
Arbitration Commission (1956-1988). The mc is comprised of a
president, a vice-president, seven senior deputy presidents, fourteen
deputy presidents and forty-two commissioners. The IRA invests the
Commission with wide ranging powers to investigate and settle disputes,

5 See generally R. Mitchell, "State Systems of Conciliation and Arbitration: The Legal Origins
of the Australasian Model" in S. Macintyre & R. Mitchell, eds., FoundationsofArbitration: The
OG'gins andEffects of State CompulsoryArbitration1890-1914 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press,
1989).
6 See S. Macintyre, The LabourExperiment (Melbourne: McPhee Gnbble Publishers, 1989).
7

See R. Simpson, "The Future of Law in Industrial Relations" in E. Kamenka & A. Erh-Soon
Tay, eds., Law andSocial Control (New York: St. Martins Press, 1980).
8 1988 (Cth) [hereinafter IRA].

1993]

Australian CompulsoryArbitration

not according to legal forms and precedents, but according to notions of
industrial fairness and equity.9 Its powers are compulsory, both in the
reference phase, when control may be taken over a dispute without the
consent of both or either party, and in the resolution phase, when the
outcome of the dispute, the award, is enforceable against all parties to
the award.10 The powers of enforcement available under the Act11 are
extensive.
Although the IRC is an independent statutory authority and
cannot be guided or directed by government to arrive at a particular
outcome, there are some broad general constraints spelled out in the
IRA, which impact upon the outcomes of the dispute-settling process. In
this regard, it is most important that the Commission takes into account
the national economy and the public interest, 12 and has regard to the
need for uniformity of terms and conditions throughout an industry. 13
A further major feature of the legislative framework for
14
compulsory arbitration is that it requires the registration of unions.
Unions are encouraged to register under the IRA in order to act as
representative bodies in the arbitral process. They have also had a major
unions are
role in policing and enforcing awards. Virtually all major
15
registered under the compulsory arbitration provisions.
The importance of unions to the system is underlined by the
considerable advantages, which they obtain under the statutory
framework. With registration, they secure a separate legal personality,
more or less automatic recognition by the employer, and something
approaching a monopoly of coverage in the industries or occupations for
which they are registered. They are also entitled to receive preferential
treatment in employment for their members. While, on the other hand,
Australian registered unions are the subject of considerable regulation
over their internal affairs, and to a lesser degree over their external
to have
powers and objectives, this regulation does not appear
16
power.
and
independence
their
diminished
substantially
9b~i, S. 110.

10 bid., s. 149.
11

See, for example, ibid., Part VIII, Part X, and Part XI.

12 Ibid, s. 90.
13

bid., s. 94.

14 Ibid., Part IX.
15
16

This registration also includes many "State" branches registered under the State Acts.

See R.C. McCallum, "Federal Controls Upon Trade Unions: The Australian Enigma" in D.
Rawson & C. Fisher, eds., ChangingIndustrialLaw (Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984).
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A final feature of the statutory framework of compulsory
arbitration concerns the restriction of industrial action. It follows from
the theory of compulsory arbitration that industrial action is
unnecessary-and there are considerable restrictions, in the IRA and
17
elsewhere, upon strikes and other forms of direct action.
It is in relation to industrial action that we find a greater reliance
upon external legal rights in the course of the settlement of industrial
disputes. This aspect of the arbitral system has long been one of great
contention, particularly since the virtual abandonment of the practical
use of the penalties available under the Act. Where disputes are not
resolved within the system, industrial action may occur on a protracted
basis. Although it has been the tendency of the parties to seek
compromise by continuing the use of the conciliation and arbitration
machinery, resort is not infrequently made to common law powers to
punish direct action, and to statutory powers dealing with secondary
18
boycotts.
Two more issues need to be addressed before we can examine
the impact of compulsory arbitration upon the labour market and the
obstacles it presents to economic and industrial reform.
First, it is necessary to understand the important regulatory role
played by the awards (outcomes) of the system. As the arbitration
process has evolved in Australia, awards have virtually come to codify
the legal terms and conditions of employment for about 80 per cent of
the workforce throughout the private and public sectors of the
economy. 19 The bulk of these award terms concerns the wage/effort
exchange-principally laying down work classification structures, basic
rates of pay within those classifications, working hours, holidays, leave,
conditions for termination, and so on.
This specification of terms and conditions has both a public and
private legal operation. Awards and agreements establish the minimum
standards below which it is unlawful for an employer to continue
employing labour. This, then, represents a form of a fair employment
contract, which public policy dictates as desirable and, which is
enforceable through a criminal/penal process exercised principally by
specific enforcement agencies or by unions. In addition to this, the
award system impacts upon the contract of employment, enabling
17

See IRA, supranote 8, Part X and Part X.

18

For recent case studies see M. Pittard, "Trade Practices Law and the Mudginberri Dispute"

(1988) 1 Austl. J. Lab. Law 23; and K. McEvoy & R. Owens, "The Flight of Icarus: Legal Aspects of

the Pilots' Dispute" (1990) 3 Austl. J. Lab. Law 87.
19 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Award coverage,Australia (catalogue no. 6315.0, May 1991).
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employees
to recover their award entitlements through private legal
20
action.
Secondly, it is important to appreciate the nature of the process
whereby industrial disputes are settled in the Australian system. In
appearance there is no doubt that the process of arbitration has taken,
and, to an extent at least, still takes a quasi-judicial form, although the
statutes are often very specific about the non-legal nature of the
proceedingsP In part this judicial form is suggested by the legislation
itself with different processes occuring in a logical sequence. Disputes
are initiated by serving demands upon the opposing party, the tribunal is
notified, an avenue of appeal against the decision is provided, and the
decision is eventually legally enforced. These are all concepts redolent
with the flavour of legal proceedings. The judicial appearance of
arbitration has also been substantially manufactured in the methods of
operation employed within the tribunals themselves. For example,
parties to disputes may present evidence supporting their case, may be
cross-examined on this evidence, and their argument may be supported
by principles that have emerged from previous decisions.
The combination of these and other factors gave rise to the
development of a general judicial theory of arbitration, which largely
characterized the interpretation of the industrial relations process until
the 1960s. 22 Within this theory, the role of precedent and the objective
of industrial justice were presented as the rftajor determinants of the
tribunal's decision making, and other material issues such as the
pressure of market forces, political pressures, bargaining power, and so
on were accorded little importance2 3
The general consensus of opinion now is that this theory of
arbitration was little more than a myth, although the judicial explanation
of arbitration may have had greater efficacy in certain types of disputes
than in others. Generally speaking, arbitration operated subject to the
usual pressures placed on all industrial relations systems. However, it
occurred in the context of the relationships and pressures formed by the
unique institutions themselves, in particular by the need of the industrial

20

See, for example, Gregoryv. Phih'pMornis(1988), 80 A.L.

455.

21 IRA, supranote 8, s. 110; and IndustrialRelationsAct 1991 (N.S.W.), s. 354.
22

T. Sheridan, "Of Mind-sets and Market Forces: The Contribution of Historical Research to

Industrial Relations" in G. Patmore, ed.,/-Fistoy andIndustialRelations (Sydney:. Australian Centre

for IR Research & Teaching, University of Sydney, 1990) at 43.
23 Ibid.
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a peculiarly
tribunals to guarantee their own role and by the existence of 24
dynamic relationship between the tribunals and trade unions.
It follows from the above that it is unwise to attribute to the
compulsory arbitration authority the kind of autonomy and
independence that would usually be reserved for judicial bodies,
notwithstanding its legislative character. 25 The federal tribunal's
autonomy has always been qualified to a degree by its economic and
political context, and, therefore, the extent of its autonomy has always
been relative, not absolute. Having made that point, it is pertinent to
note that until recently, generally speaking, national governments from
both sides of the political divide tended not to intrude too greatly into
the national tribunal's deliberations. A brief example will serve to make
the point. Of nineteen national wage cases brought before the
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission in the years 1953 to 1972, the
federal government, largely reserving its role to the presentation of
evidence and advice, indicated a preference for a money outcome in only
four cases.2 6 An extreme case may be seen in R. G. Menzies' Liberal
Government's response to the National Wage Case of 19527 Inflation
at that time was an unprecedented 20 per cent, and the employers'
submission was that there should be a reduction in the basic wage, an
increase in the standard hours of employment, and an abolition of
automatic quarterly cost of living adjustments. The government refused
either to support or to oppose the employers' applications, the Prime
Minister stating in Parliament that it was a matter for the legal process
28
and not a political matter.
To summarize, arbitration was a system introduced to facilitate
the settlement of industrial disputes and to regularize patterns of
industrial relations in Australia. It evolved, however, quite quickly into a
national system for regulating employment contracts by award, cloaked
in a rather technical and legalized process. Compared to most other
industrial relations systems, the institutions, legislation, and awards of

24

See B. Dabscheck, "The Australian System of Industrial Relations: An Analytical Model"

(1980) 22 J. of Indust. Rel. 196.
25
bid
26

See D. Brereton, Institutions in the Wage DeterminationProcess: The Australian Conciliation
andArbitrationCommission 1904-70 (Stanford University, Department of Political Science, 1989)
[unpublished].
27

See Metal TradesAward1952 (1968), 124 CA.I 463.

28

Commonwealth Parliamentaxy Debates (House of Representatives) 19 August 1952, at 390-
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the Australian system were unique, as was their impact on the labour
market.
III. THE SYSTEM'S IMPACT UPON THE LABOUR MARKET
The pressures for change in industrial relations law and
institutions must be understood in the context of the impact made by
those laws and institutions upon industrial'relations processes and
labour market operation. These are complex matters and there is space
here only for a brief survey of the major issues.
A. Wages and Conditions
From the time of its introduction, the system of industrial
dispute settlement was basically concerned with the essence of the
employment relationship-the wage/work bargain. The settlement of
industrial disputes developed into a formalized process whereby
increases in wages and other conditions of employment were obtained
and passed on to other sections of the workforce. This process tended to
be relatively centralized, with major national or industry cases showing
the way. The standards adopted in those cases flowed into all federal
awards and into state awards, where they were accepted by the state
tribunals. This process helped maintain a uniform level of minimum
employment guarantees throughout the country. Market forces were
directly recognized only in the form of over-award payments, which were
themselves usually subject to comparison and flow-on pressures. It is a
point of interest to note that, notwithstanding this relative uniformity
across occupations and industries, Australia is estimated to have one of
the most flexible external labour markets among Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (ommD) countries 29
Much of the centralized control of the system depended upon the
authority and status of the tribunals, particularly the federal body. Prior
to the late 1960s, the legal constraints upon the use of direct action were
extensive, and were implemented sufficiently frequently to lend credence
to the so-called judicial model. Even when the enforcement powers
were effectively curtailed in the late 1960s, the underlying central control
of the tribunal-though from time to time demonstrated to be
29 National Labour Consultative Council, LabourMarket Flexibility in the Australian Setting
(Canberra: AOPs, 1987).
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questionable-was generally sustained by the influence of the key
employer and union peak councils for much of the period from 1960 to
19900
Generally speaking, this convention of centralized dispute
settlement has provided a useful device whereby wages can be
distributed on a national basis according to the level of unemployment
and inflation. Thus, in the depression years of 1930-1932, the federal
tribunal was able to bring about a uniform decrease of 10 per cent in
award wages, and in the 1970s, it was able to implement a system of
wage indexation which kept wage growth below the rate of inflation. On
the other hand, it also follows that bargaining arrangements have tended
to be at the industry rather than at the firm level, and that the focus of
award fixation has tended to be upon the macro-wage level, downplaying or neglecting the conditions of individual enterprises and matters
of productivity and efficiency at the work place level. These are features
of the Australian system which have been subject to much recent
criticism.3 1
B. Award Coverage
Another important outcome of the compulsory arbitration
system is the pervasiveness of awards. Unlike other industrial relations
systems, it has been virtually impossible for employers to escape the
regulation of the award system in Australia. This is principally because
the system of compulsory arbitration does not require union involvement
at the place of work in order for employers and employees to be drawn
into the process. At the national level, employers may be covered by
award conditions when they are made parties to a dispute-a relatively
straightforward procedure. They in turn will be bound in respect of all
of their employees, whether unionized or not, and whether or not these
employees are in actual dispute with the employer. 32 At the national
level, therefore, the award has acted as a de facto common rule. In the
state systems awards are common rules dejure.
30

See Sheridan, supra note 22.

31 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Economic Surveys:
Australia (Paris: oEcD, 1990); and J. Hyde & J. Nurick, eds., Wages Wasteland: The AustralianWage
FiringSystem (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1985).
32
W.B. Creighton, W.j. Ford & R.J. Mitchell, Labour Law: Text andMaterials (Sydney: Law
Book Co., 1993) c. 19; and B. Creighton & A. Stewart, Labour Law: An Introduction (Sydney:
Federation Press, 1990) at 73.
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The implications of these arrangements are obvious. Leaving
aside major industry where there is active unionism, Australia has about
580 thousand (non-farm) small enterprises, each with fewer than twenty
employees. Seventy per cent of these have no union members, with 67
per cent of workplaces (of any size) in the private sector having none.
On the other hand, the vast majority of workplaces are covered by award
conditions.33 Approximately 80 per cent of all Australian employees are
covered by awards.
C. Award Structure and Content
Australian award structure has been extremely complex,
reflecting the complexities of trade union organization. Thus, awards
typically have applied to occupations and/or to industries, and some
employers have been covered by multiple awards regulating various
parts of their workforce. While relatively few workplaces have had
multi-award coverage, its impact, where it occurred, was pronounced
because of the proportion of workers employed in these larger
workplaces. Multi-award coverage has complicated the administration
of enterprises and the industrial relations process.
In terms of content, awards deal most extensively with the
wage/work exchange-principally with the rewards for labour under
time-hire contracts (for example, wages, allowances, various forms of
leave, and so on). As part of this regulation, hours of work are
prescribed and certain other limited duties apply, but there has been no
general performance requirement built into awards beyond the normal
expectations of the principles inherent in the contract of employment.
In general, there are three areas in which it is agreed that awards
have produced outcomes inimical to improving efficiency and
productivity. First, job classifications specified in awards became very
technical hnd, over time, narrowly defined. This in turn resulted in jobs
lacking potential for career opportunity and hampered the employer's
flexible use of labour. Second, severe restrictions upon the spread of
working hours and the use of casuals and part-time labour in many
industries has limited the employer's power to schedule and organize the
work process. Thirdly, awards on the whole did not encourage the use of
performance-based pay systems, either as an adjunct to, or a substitute
for, the time-rate system. It is in these areas, which provide for internal
33 R. Callus et aL, IndustrialRelations at Work. The Australian Workplace IndustrialRelations
Survey (Canberra: Commonwealth Department of Industrial Relations, AcpS, 1991) c. 3.
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labour market flexibility, that Australia's performance is said to be
particularly poor.
D. Union Influence and Growth
Several aspects of the compulsory arbitration system have
contributed to the important and powerful position which unions hold in
Australian industrial relations. First, their participation was seen as vital
to the success of arbitration, and they were, therefore, bestowed with
several legal advantages under the arbitration statutes. Registration
brought with it automatic recognition, but benefits such as legal status,
preferential treatment for union members in employment, and
protection against discrimination further enhanced that position. 5 The
influence of arbitration may be seen in the rapid growth of
unionism-both in terms of numbers of unions and density of union
membership-between 1900 and 1920. Since then Australian unions
have remained one of the most numerically powerful movements in the
industrialized democracies, though suffering a steady decline in
membership since the early 1980s.3 6

Aside from becoming numerically strong, Australian unions have
been very influential in the industrial relations process because they are
the organizations that, on the whole, have been responsible for
processing claims, establishing awards, and supervising those awards.
Furthermore, the terms of awards impose a far greater percentage of
duties and responsibilities upon employers than upon employees. Those
who claim that the system operates principally for the benefit of unions
and their members are, therefore, in a sense correct, though this is by no
means a valid criticism of the system as a whole. The key issue is
whether in performing this function, the unions are fulfilling a valuable
role on a broader social and economic scale.

34

See M. Rimmer & J. Zappala, "Labor Market Flembility and the Second Tier" (1988) 14

Austl. Bull. of Lab. 564.
35 See IRA, supra note 8, s. 192 (incoxporation of organizations), s. 122 (preference power),
and s. 334 (offence provisions where discrimination against members of organizations).
36 S. Crean & M. RimmerAustralian Unions:Adjustment to Change (Monash: National Key
Centre in Industrial Relations, Monash University, 1990) at 3; and R. Mitchell & P. Scherer,
"Australia: The Search for Fair Employment Contracts through Tribunals" in J. Hartog & J.
Theeuwes, eds., Labour Market Contracts and Institutions: A Cross National Comparison
(Amsterdam: North Holland, 1993) 77 at 87-90.
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E. Union Structure
An important additional impact which arbitration legislation has
had upon the union movement concerns the latter's structure. At the
turn of the century, Australian unions were organized along craft,
industry, and general conglomerate lines, and the requirements for
registration under arbitration legislation institutionalized such a varied
organizational structure. Hence, subsequent rationalization proved very
difficult to achieve. As a result of this, Australian workplaces are
marked by multi-unionism, with the attendant problems of complex
bargaining arrangements and demarcation disputes associated with that
state of affairs. A distinct but associated problem concerns the fact that
a high percentage of Australian trade unions are small in size and many
have difficulty in adequately representing their members' interests 3 7
F. IndustrialAction
Finally, it should be noted that, despite its apparent objectives,
the arbitration system has been unable to eliminate, or perhaps even to
reduce, the extent to which the parties to industrial relations resort to
direct action in pursuit of their claims. For many critics, this single fact
encapsulates the failure of the compulsory arbitration
system-employers being effectively bound to comply with award
conditions while unions are free to take industrial action to achieve overaward benefits.38 Although international comparisons of strike data are
notoriously difficult to make with any degree of accuracy, the Australian
record is certainly worse than many other countries, including many of
those in which the strike weapon is accepted as a legitimate part of the
industrial relations process 3 9 On the other hand, while the compulsory
arbitratioh system has not reduced the incidence of strikes, it appears to
have influenced the nature of strike action. The pattern of activity
disclosed by the comparative data indicates that Australian industrial

37 Australian Council of Trade Unions, Future Strategiesfor the Trade Union Movement

(Melbourne: Acru, 1987).
38

See, for example, B. Brown & L.G. Rowe, "Industrial Relations in Australia: The Need for
Change" in Hyde & Nurick, supra note 31.
39 See Committee of Review, Australian Industrial Relations Law and Systems, vol. 2
(Canberra: AUPs, 1985) (Chair. K Hancock) at 130-3&
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disputes are characterized by high numbers of short-term strikes,
designed to bring to the tribunals' attention the issues in dispute.40

IV. PRESSURES FOR REFORM
Since its introduction in 1904, the national system of compulsory
arbitration has been subject to an almost continuous process of minor
and major legislative amendment, culminating in a major reconstruction
and re-drafting of the IRA in 1988,41 and followed by several key
amendments in 1991 and 1992.42 Notwithstanding this process of
change, however, the key elements of the system outlined earlier in this
paper remain relatively undisturbed. Nevertheless, there is a steady,
incremental process of reform underway, which, perhaps understated in
the appearance of the legislation, is without doubt unprecedented in the
history of the compulsory arbitration system.
What are the sources of this pressure for reform? First,
Australia has clearly been influenced by international developments. 43
Since the mid-1970s at least, there has been a strong trend in Europe
and North America, and most recently in New Zealand, towards the
deregulation of labour markets and industrial relations practices. In
part, some of this pressure is purely ideological, with a resurgence of free
market ideas emerging particularly in the United Kingdom and the
United States.44 However, the principal cause of the change in industrial
relations internationally has undoubtedly been the relative decline of the
industrialized market economies. Among the reasons for this are the
decline of many basic industries such as steel, shipbuilding, textiles and
general manufacturing; the offshore activities of multi-national
40

Mitchell & Scherer, supra note 36 at 109.

41 IR, supra note 86
42

The chief amendments made in 1991 were a re-writing of the provisions dealing with union
amalgamations and the insertion of section l18A, which clarified the mc's powers concerning the
rights of unions to represent particular groups of employees (IndustrialRelations Legislation
Amendment Act 1990, Act No. 19 of 1991). In 1992 provisions were inserted in the IRA that allow
the rRc to deal with contracts involving independent contractors; those sections dealing with
certified agreements were repealed and replaced by a new Division 3A (IndustrialRelations
AmendmentAct 1992, Act No. 109 of 1992).
43
See, for example, J. Niland, TransformingIndustrialRelations in New South Wales:A Green
Paper,vol. 1 (Sydney. N.S.W. Government Printer, 1989) at 34.

44 P. Brook, Freedom at Work-The Case of Reforming Labour Law in New Zealand
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1990); D. Drache & H. Glasbeek, The Changing Workplace:
ReshapingCanada'sIndustrialRelationsSystem (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1992).

1993]

Australian CompulsoryArbitration

corporations; a wave of new technology; and steady increases in
unemployment. In other words, industrial relations reform has been
seen as a necessary step towards economic restructuring. 45
Secondly, this process has been heightened by particular
developments within Australia. Shielded behind tariff barriers,
Australian manufacturing industry operated within a basically domestic
market, while the economy was supported by earnings from the export of
primary commodities, which were responsible for about 85 per cent of
export earnings. However, earnings from exported primary commodities
have long been on the decline, and over the past fifteen years efforts
have been made to internationalize the economy with a gradual
withdrawal of protectionist policies.
Until the 1980s these developments were slow to impact upon
the labour market. However, in the early 1980s the Australian
manufacturing industry, in particular, experienced a massive shakeout,
which saw the loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs and a rapid increase
in unemployment to a level of about 10 per cent in 1983. Employment in
the manufacturing sector, which had peaked at about 28 per cent in
1950, declined to less than 20 per cent by 1983 and this decline has
continued (15.3 per cent in 1990).46 These developments gave rise to a
revised and much more pro-active approach in the Australian union
movement towards the problems of industry and labour market policy
47
and the associated questions of industrial relations.

During the 1980s these pressures had come to focus upon a set
of common objectives associated with economic restructuring, shared by
most sectors of the political and economic community. These objectives
include shifting the focus of industrial relations strategy to the workplace
(or enterprise), rationalizing award structure and content to enhance
flexibility, rationalizing union structure and improving the skill levels and
skill flexibility of the workforce.

45 J. Niland & 0. Clarke, eds, Agenda for Change: An InternationalAnalysis of Industrial
Relationsin Transition(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1991).
46 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Australia, (catalogue no. 6203.0, August

1990).
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AcT/rDAustraliaReconstnucte& ACTu/TDC Mission to Western Europe (Canberra: Aops,
1987). See also Acru, Statement ofAccord by theAustralianLaborPartyandtheAustralian Councilof
Trade UnionsRegardingEconomicPolicy (Melbourne: Ac ru, 1983).
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V. THE PROCESS OF REFORM
A. PublicDebateand Inquiry
Numerous official and private inquiries into the state of
industrial relations laws, institutions and practices, and debates, which
have developed around the activities of special interest and pressure
groups, have underscored the process of reform in Australia. In this
debate a private organization known as the H.R. Nicholls Society has
adopted an extreme position. It advocates the dismantling of the
compulsory arbitration system and the wholesale deregulation of the
labour market, including the use of civil remedies against trade unions in
the course of industrial disputes. 48 These views are shared by one or two
employers' associations. They are not, however, the views publicly taken
by the major. federal political parties nor of most major parties to
industrial relations.
Of the many inquiries conducted at the national and state levels,
very few have addressed the issue of industrial relations and its
relationship to economic restructuring in more than marginal terms.
The most important inquiry of the 1980s was that appointed by the
national Labor government (under the Chairmanship of Professor Keith
Hancock) in 1983. In its 1985 report, the Hancock Committee declined
to make any recommendations for the radical reform of the compulsory
arbitration system. It stated:
After an examination of all the material before us, we reached the conclusion that no
substantial case had been made that industrial relations would improve if conciliation and
arbitration were abandoned in favour of some other system, such as collective bargaining.

Thus, we have concluded that conciliation and arbitration should remain the mechanism
for regulating industrial relations in Australia.
We accept that the system is in need of revision and that efforts should be made to
improve its operation. 49

This conclusion served to heighten debate rather than to assuage
it. While it is true that the report was conservative-and did little to
induce serious systemic change, especially at the workplace level-it did
make certain recommendations for reform, which went some way
towards addressing the pressing problems of centralism and union
48 See H.R. Nicholls Society, Arbitration in Contempt (Melbourne: Seminar Proceedings,

1986).
AGPs,

49 Committee of Review, AustralianIndustrialRelationsLaw and Systems, vol. 1 (Canberra:
1985) (Chair.YL Hancock) at 2.
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structure 5 0 Many of these recommendations were carried through in
the major revision of the system enacted in 1988.
Standing in stark contrast to the Hancock Report are the results
other
inquiries undertaken in the latter half of the 1980s. One of
of two
these, the Niland Report, was commissioned by the Liberal/National
(non-Labor) New South Wales government in June 1988. The central
thrust of the report was that industrial relations issues should be
decentralized and dealt with at an industry or enterprise level. Several
recommendations were made to facilitate collective bargaining, in
general, and enterprise bargaining in particular. These included
developing enterprise-based bargaining units and providing for special
enterprise agreements. At a more general level, compulsory arbitration
was to be maintained for disputes over rights only. Thus, the parties
would have no access to state machinery for disputes over interests that
would of necessity have to be settled by direct negotiation or through
industrial action. Strikes would be legal only in interest disputes. The
basis for these recommendations was to foster greater productive
efficiency, to develop an awareness of the link between the prosperity of
the enterprise and those who work in it, and to link wage adjustment to
productivity or gain-sharing in the enterprise.51
The second inquiry of note was that undertaken by the Business
Council of Australia. In 1987 it established an Industrial Relations
Study Commission to look into the advisability of an enterprise-based
industrial relations system. Its report, Enterprise-BasedBargainingUnits:
A Better Way of Working,52 is as explicit as the Niland Report in its
enthusiasm for an enterprise focus, but unlike the other reports
examined, it does not regard legislative change as being vital to the
achievement of that objective. On the contrary, its research data
disclose management to be the central force for change and, therefore,
identify the shift to enterprise industrial relations as a management
problem. Enterprise bargaining units and agreements are seen as being
attainable within the existing legislative framework.53
These various reports have provided the main focus for debate
over the need for industrial relations reform. Others have taken a
50 See M. Quinlan & M. Rimmer, "Workplace Industrial Relations Reform and Legislative
Change: Hancock, Hanger, Niland and the Business Council of Australia" (1989) 2 Lab. & Indust.
434.
51 See Niland, supra note 43 at 17 and at 19.
52 Business Council of Australia, Enterprise-BasedBargainingUnits: A Better Way of Working,
vol. 1 (Melbourne: BcA, July 1989) [hereinafter BcA Report].
53 See Quinlan & Rimmer, supra note 50 at 445.
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different approach to questions affecting Australian industrial relations.
One prominent example is the Australian Council of Trade Unions'
(Acm) Future Strategiesfor the Trade Union Movement (1987), 54 which
proposes a restructuring process based upon the amalgamation of
unions into twenty major industry groups as a means of both securing
trade union survival against legal attack and providing improved and
more efficient services to members. In accordance with the ACTU'S
policy of restructuring, the number of federally registered unions has
fallen from 142 in August 1989 to seventy-two in July 1993. It is
anticipated that the number of unions will drop to approximately fiftyfive by the end of 1993. 55
B. Legislative Reform
In order to anticipate the potential legal developments in the
21st century, it is necessary to identify those trends of the late 20th
century, which are both ongoing and relevant. However, separating out
some legislative developments from others, particularly in a very active
field, is an arbitrary process. For argument's sake one might postulate
that the process of economic restructuring has been underway since the
mid-1970s at least, and that, therefore, the legislation of that period is
worthy of close examination. It is the contention of this paper, however,
that the onset of a fundamental reappraisal of the role of compulsory
arbitration in the Australian economy began in the Australian Labor
Party and the union movement as late as the mid-1980s. It is, therefore,
from the legislation of around this time that most inferences as to the
future should be drawn. Having established that standpoint, however, it
is relevant, if not vital, to reappraise the position to take account of
earlier developments.
There is evidence from some late 1970s and early 1980s
legislation that the compulsory arbitration system and its structures
might no longer be regarded as inviolable. Examples appear both at the
national and state levels. They include the virtual abolition of the
jurisdiction of compulsory arbitration over the electricity industry in
Queensland and its replacement by a tribunal with greatly reduced
powers, 56 and the decision of the national Labor government to
54

Acr,

supra note 37.

55 Workforce, issue no. 934, July 1993.

56Electricity (Continuity of Supply)Act 1985 (Qld.); ElecticityAuthoritiesIndustrialCausesAct
1985 (QId.).
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introduce special legislation to de-register a radical building union,
rather than rely on the powers available under the IRA. 5 7

More

important was the approach of the national Liberal/National Party
coalition (non-Labor) government (1975-1983) to industrial relations in
the public sector in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Legislation
introduced at this time included the abolition of the rights of arbitration
in respect of a number of managerial functions, which were principally
related to the reduction of expenditure and the increase of efficiency in
the public sector 5 8
We may draw from these incidents the conclusion that
governments were becoming increasingly willing to make laws to by-pass
the compulsory arbitration system when necessary. As yet, however, no
political party had evinced an intention to introduce legislation which
went much further than evading the system. The most recent and
important reforms to the national system occurred with the introduction
of the IRA in 1988, and the subsequent amendments to it in 1991 and
1992.59 It was noted earlier that the recommendations of the Hancock
Report, which formed the basis of the new legislation, made no°
proposals for a radical attack on the essence of compulsory arbitration6
There were, however, some new provisions which attempted to meet
criticisms of the existing framework. These included provisions which
impacted upon enterprise industrial relations-among them, an
emphasis upon the inclusion of grievance procedures in agreements, and
a new procedure for certified agreements in industrial disputes. 6 '
These agreements, originally known as "section 115"
agreements, allowed the parties, in theory at least, to conduct their
industrial relations outside the compulsory arbitration system-cutting
off their terms and conditions from the centralized award conditions.
But the procedure that was introduced in 1988 remained a half-hearted
gesture. Agreements were not required to be "enterprise" or "industry"
in nature, and they remained subject to scrutiny by the national inc. It
was necessary, for example, for the agreement to satisfy a public interest

57

Builders,'Labourers'Federation
(Cancellationof Registration)Act 1986 (Cth).

58 The Public Service ArbitrationAmendment Act, 1980 (Cth); Commonwealth Employees

(Redeployment and Retirement)AmendmentAct, 1980 (Cdh).
59RA, supra note 42.
60 Committee of Review, supra note 49
61
RA, supranote 8, ss. 115-17 and in particulars. 115(8).
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test. 62 Criticism about the inflexibility of the procedure led ultimately to
the repeal of section 115 in 1992 and its replacement by an entirely new
division (Division 3A) of the IRA dealing with certified agreements. 63
The only general requirement that must be satisfied under this new
division is that the agreement is not disadvantageousto employees taking
their employment conditions as a whole. In circumstances in which this
test is satisfied, the mc is obliged to certify the agreement. Importantly,
the new provisions also require that a union or unions must be a party to
any "single business" agreement, and thus the possibility of direct
negotiations between an employer and a single employee or between an
employer and a group of employees at the enterprise level is obstructed,
unless those agreements are at least endorsed by a trade union. 64
A second area in which the IRA might be said to have signalled
serious reform concerned the issue of union structure. Broadly
spe.aking, the policy of theAct was twofold: first, to reduce the number
of unions, (especially the small ones) and second, to bring about a
rationalization of union coverage of particular industries. Newly formed
unions could no longer be registered unless they had at least 10,000
members and were "industry" in nature.65 It was recognized, however,
that dealing with existing registered unions presented greater difficulties.
Those with fewer than 10,000 members could either justify their
continued registration or be excluded from the system. However, in
general terms the policy of the government and the union peak council
(Acru) was to reduce union numbers drastically to something in the
order of twenty "super" industry unions. This strategy was assisted in
two fundamental ways. First, simplified amalgamation procedures were
66
designed to assist smaller unions to become larger organizations.
Secondly, the IRA provided for a form of union restructuring by an order
of the IRC in the course of settling industrial disputes. Under this latter
62 R. Naughton & F. Turner, "Enterprise Bargaining Using s. 115 Certified Agreements"
(1990) 64 Law Inst. J. 722; and D. Plowman, "An Uneasy Conjunction: Opting-out and the
Arbitration System" (1992) 34 J. of Indust. Rel. 284.
63
1RA, supra note 8,ss. 134 A-N.
64

R.C. McCallum, "Enhancing Federal Enterprise Bargaining: The Industrial Relations
(Legislation Amendment) Act 1992 (Cth)" (1993) 6 Austl. J. Lab. Law 63.
65 It is unlikely that this minimum size requirement will remain in place, however, following
the success of a complaint made to the International Labour Organisation Committee on Freedom
of Association by Australian employer associations that the stipulation violated these principles
(Committee on Freedom of Association, case no. 1559). The Committee formally upheld the
complaint at its meeting in November 1992 (see 284th Report of the Committee, paras. 200-63).
66

1RA, supra note 8, s. 189, s. 193, and Part IX Div. 7 (introduced into legislation by Act no.
19 of 1991. See supranote 42).
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by order so as to bring
provision, union memberships were exchanged
7
about a form of "industry" unionism.6
The confusion of purpose in these provisions is self-evident. One
strategy is to encourage rational organization on industry lines, another
is to reduce the numbers of unions by allowing amalgamations, which
may draw members from diverse industries and occupations. Except in
the large-industry sector, enterprise unions are unable to be registered.
By and large these developments are out of step with the current push
for an enterprise focus, which is argued to be heavily dependent upon
the reduction of multi-unionism.
The legislative steps taken at the federal level, while undoubtedly
more important from a national policy point of view, have, been
outflanked by more adventurous and far-reaching changes at the state
level.68 The most important developments have taken place in the states
of Victoria and New South Wales, and these have been underscored by
the deregulation of industrial relations by the current government of
New Zealand. The Employee RelationsAct 199269 was one of the first
legislative initiatives of the newly elected Victorian Liberal/National
Party (non-Labor) government. This radical piece of legislation
abolished the system of compulsory arbitration in Victoria and replaced
it with an employee relations system based upon individual and
collective employment agreements. All existing awards of the former
industrial tribunal were abolished, and the new statutory tribunal, the
Employee Relations Commission, may only exercise its powers to settle
disputes and make future awards when all parties consent to it becoming
involved in the matter7 ° The legislation attempts to facilitate the
process of direct negotiations between employers and employees. A
collective employment agreement may be made between an employer

67/bidS, s. 118A; R. Hamilton, "Transforming Union Coverage of Australian Workplaces: The
Commission's New Demarcation Jurisdiction" (1991) 4 Aust. J.Lab. Law 1; S. Kollmorgen & R.
Naughton, "Change from Within: Reforming Trade Union Coverage and Structure" (1991) 33 J. of
Indus. Rel. 369.
68 One early example of these legislative measures was the Voluntaiy Employment Agreement
procedure introduced by the National Party (non-Labor) government of Queensland in 1987.
(vA)
This legislation allowed for direct negotiation of enterprise agreements between employers and
groups of employees. For commentary, see L Boulle, "Voluntary Employment Agreements: A
Queensland Essay" (1990) 3 Ausl.J.Lab. Law 247.
6
9 (Vic.), Act no. 83 of 1992. For ommentary, see Department of Management and Industrial
Relations, Notes on the Employee Relations Act 1992 (Victoria) (Working Paper no. 70) by R.
Mitchell (Melbourne: University of Melboume, 1992); and G. Watson, Guide to Vwctoria's Employee
Relations Law (Sydney. cci Aust. Ltd., 1993).
70

Employee RelationsAct, supra note 69, ss. 92(2) and 98(2).
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and some or all of its employees, while an individual employment
agreement is able to be made with a single employee.7 1 These
agreements are subject to certain minimum requirements (for example,
hourly rates of pay, annual leave, and sick leave).72 Apart from these
limited statutory requirements, however, the Employee Relations
Comission has no power to scrutinize the agreements and there is no
overriding public interest test. Unions have a strictly limited role under
this new Victorian regime. The legislation contemplates that unions
may be appointed as the bargaining agent for an individual employee or
group of employees, but they are not entitled to be parties to these
employment agreements. 73 There is no obligation upon an employer to
engage in bargaining, nor to recognize a bargaining agent authorized by
employees to act on their behalf.
Enterprise-focussed reforms have also been attempted in the
state of New South Wales. 74 The IndustrialRelationsAct of 199175
specifically provides for the negotiation of enterprise agreements to
regulate the conditions of employment of persons employed in a single
enterprise (defined to mean the business of a single employer).
Employee parties to an enterprise agreement may be a group of 65 per
cent of the employees in an enterprise, or a works committee
representing the employees in an enterprise. There is no general
requirement that an enterprise agreement must be in the public interest,
and such agreements may override all or any of the conditions set out in
New South Wales' awards, although there are safeguards spelled out in
the Act preventing the undercutting of minimum conditions, such as
standard hours, work, holidays, sick leave, and so on.76 Enterprise
agreements must be registered to be enforceable, and there is a
Commissioner for Enterprise Agreements, whose role is to counsel the
parties and to promote the use of enterprise agreements generally.
These provisions contain important distinctions from their
counterpart in the federal RA. In particular, they enable non-unionized
groups of workers to make agreements through a works committee,
which in effect is a form of enterprise unionism, and they exclude a

71 bid, ss. 8 and 9.
72TIW, Schedule 1.
73
74

bib, ss. 8 and 9.
1ndustrialArbitration(EnterpdiseAgreements)AmendmentAct, 1990 (N.S.W.), s. 131(3).

75 (N.s.w.)
76

(ch. 2, pt. 3, div. 2).

1bid, s. 122.
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general overriding public interest test whereby the industrial tribunal
exercises its authority over the content of the agreement.
The strategy for enterprise-focussed agreements and bargaining
units also formed the basis of the Liberal/National Opposition parties at
the time of the 1993 federal election, which was fought, to a not
inconsiderable degree over the future of the Australian industrial
relations sytem. The federal coalition parties had planned to implement
industrial legislation based upon the Jobsback policy, which was
announced in October 1992.77 The general strategy outlined in Jobsback
was very similar to the provisions of the Employee Relations Act 1992
(Vic). It proposed to replace compulsory arbitration with an industrial
relations system based upon employment agreements that were directly
negotiated between employers and employees. The regulation of terms
of employment by award was only to be an option where all parties
agreed to "opt -in" to the award system. Jobsbackreferred to workplace
agreements that were able to be negotiated between employers and
either individual employees or some or all of the workforce. In essence,
this would allow for a form of enterprise bargaining by individuals or by
non-unionized groups. According to the coalition policy, the mc would
be retained, but was likely to play a considerably reduced role in dispute
settlement. It was, for example, only empowered to make an award or
settle disputes when all parties voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction.
Another important aspect of Jobsbackwas its emphasis on principles of
freedom of association, most particularly the right of an individual not to
join a trade union. Compulsory unionism and "closed shop"
arrangements were to be outlawed and the mc was to be prohibited from
including preference clauses in workplace agreements or awards. The
Jobsback policy also favoured the development of enterprise unionism
through the removal of the 10,000 minimum membership requirement
currently expressed in the RA.
A further source of influence upon future non-Labor
governments might be found in the New Zealand Employment Contracts
Act of 1991.78 This Act, which has attracted much interest in Australian
business circles, and formed at least, in part, the conceptual inspiration
for the Victorian legislation, provides no institutional support for parties

77

LIberal Party of Australia, Jobsback - The FederalCoalition's IndustrialRelations Policy,

October 1992.
781991 (no. 22/91).
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negotiating their employment contracts other than the right to appoint a
bargaining agent, which may or may not be a union. 79
At a broader level, there are other relevant areas of legislation
that bear upon the general reform of Australian industrial relations.
One point that emerges from the foregoing discussion is the potential
divisiveness between state jurisdictions and between state and national
jurisdictions. As long as the system remains split in this way, a coherent
strategy for the reform of industrial relations will continue to be
obstructed by a combination of constitutional and political problems.
The difficulties presented by the presence of a dual structure in
Australian industrial relations have been the subject of much
discussion 8 0 As early as 1983, legislative steps were taken by the federal
government to improve the level of cooperation and coordination
between the federal and state systems. Among these amendments were
the facilitating of joint proceedings of federal and state tribunals;
reference of disputes by the federal tribunal to a state tribunal; and
provision for members of the federal tribunal to deal with particular
state disputes on request by a state tribunal.81 New measures to further
this process, including the dual appointment of persons to both federal
and state tribunals and regular meetings between the heads of the state
and federal tribunals and the Registrars of these tribunals, were made in
1988.82 While none of this establishes an integrated system as such, it
provides assistance in promoting greater consistency and uniformity in
amending awards.
Finally, national government has provided support for a national
training policy aimed at improving the skill base of the workforce. The
argument that Australian workforce skills are too low and that new
award structures-less rigidly defined in job terms-should be designed
to encourage mobility of employees within organizations as they gain
increased skills and a greater range of skills, underpins the thrust of
award restructuring. The Labor government's TrainingGuaranteeAct of
199083 and associated legislation establishes a scheme whereby

employers with an annual payroll of more than $220,000 must spend at

79 See M. Wilson, "Employment Contracts Act 1991-The End of an Industrial Relations

System" (1991) 4 Austl. J. Lab. Law 268.
80 See Committee of Review, vol. 2, supra note 39, c 6.
81

RA, supranote 8, s. 173.

82

bid, ss. 13-14 and ss. 171-75.

83 1990 (Cth). See R. Naughton, "Federal Training Legislation" (1992) 4 Austl. J. Lab. Law
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least 1.5 per cent of their total payroll on training activities which are
employment related.
C. The Accord
Important though these various legislative experiments may have
been, undoubtedly the key to understanding the process of industrial
relations and labour market reform in the 1980s is the Accord between
the Australian Labor Party and the Acru.8 4 The Accord was established
shortly before the 1983 general election, which saw a national Labor
government elected to office for the first time since 1975. Nominally
the Accord was an agreement between the political and industrial wings
of the labour movement on prices and incomes. However, in reality it
was a wide ranging political agreement covering economic policy
generally. In its early years, the Accord was principally a vehicle for
controlling the outcome of National Wage Case decisions. Thus, each
case was preceded by extensive negotiations between the government
and the Acru in which arrangements were made for a desirable
"package" of wage outcomes and other social benefits, which might be
presented to the national tribunal (the mc).
The Accord proved remarkably successful in restraining wage
outcomes in the context of continued economic problems, including
adverse trade balances and the collapse of the Australian dollar. Under
it, the unions were restricted to a level of indexed increases and bound
by a commitment not to seek further increases. In return, the
government agreed to institute various social measures, including a form
of price control, re-establishing a programme of government health
insurance, reforming the tax system, and increasing the level of
minimum wages. Unions that attempted to break out of this centralized
system were generally unsuccessful, as there was no support from the
AcrU or other unions for any anti-Accord strategy. Only one union, the
radical Builders' Labourers' Federation, persistently defied the no-extraclaims commitment, and it was removed from the compulsory arbitration
system by a process of de-registration in 1986.85
Prior to 1987 the Accord process relied upon a highly centralized
approach to industrial relations reform. The National Wage Decision of

84 Ac'ru, Statement ofAccord, supranote 47.
85 For a case study see L. Bennett, "Legislative Policy and Design: Federal Deregistration and
the 'Destruction! of the Builders' Labourers' Federation" (1991) 4 Austl. J. Lab. Law 18.
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March 198786 brought major change to that strategy by linking the
process of wage fixation with microeconomic reform in a very detailed
manner.
The 1987 case 8 7 introduced a two-tier wage system. Under the
first tier, the workforce was granted a discounted wage increase of a flat
sum. Under the second tier, unions and employers were required to
bargain for a further increase of up to 4 per cent under a "restructuring
and efficiency" principle. This required the parties to show that
restrictive work practices, formal and informal, were being eliminated
and that these were equivalent, in productivity terms, to the increase
being sought. This principle was very effective in removing restrictions
on working time, overtime, use of casual and part-time labour, and bther
work-related restrictions. It also brought about changes in award
structures, payment systems, and the use of internal disputes
procedures.8
This process was taken a step further in the National Wage
Decision of August 1988.V9 A new principle, "structural efficiency," was
introduced to replace the two-tier system. Under this principle, unions
were granted an increase in wages upon the condition that they
undertook a complete restructuring of their existing awards (particularly
in content, job classification, and wage relativities). That process
commenced in 1988 and is ongoing.
Throughout the 1980s the national tribunal (the mc) endorsed,
with some minor qualification, the tenor of these various Accord
arrangements-a process which has been described as "managed
decentralism."9 0 This practice seemed to have come to an end with the
decision of the mc in the National Wage Decision of April 1991.91 In
essence the arrangements under the Accord submitted in this case were
for a twelve dollar increase and for the possibility of a further 4.5 per
cent to be paid as a result of enterprise bargaining for productivity
increases. The mC refused to follow this formula in making its decision,
and thus, failed. to enforce this further step towards enterprise

86 (1987), 17 I.R. 65. See Creighton, Ford & Mitchell, supranote 32 at 710-31.
87I1bid

88 See Commonwealth Department of Industrial Relations, Report on the Operation of the
RestructuringandEfficiency Principle(Canberra: Aors, April 1990).
89(1988), 251.1. 170.
90 T. McDonald & M. Rimmer, "Award Restructuring and Wages Policy" (1989) 37 Growth
111, CEDA.
91 (1991), 361.1. 120.
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bargaining. The mc granted a 2.5 per cent increase and provided for the
continuation of the structural efficiency process, which is far from
complete. It declined to opt for the additional level of wage increases
for enterprise bargaining, citing as reasons the Australian economy's
inability to sustain further wage increases, the lack of an enterprise
industrial relations culture in Australia, and the problem of calculating
the amount of productivity increases. The decision was condemned by
the union and government parties, and the key elements of the Accord
policy were subsequently pursued in direct negotiations with employers
outside the compulsory arbitration system. However, in its National
Wage Case of October 1991,92 the mc consented to the notion of
enterprise bargaining agreements in setting down a series of principles
designed to give greater emphasis to arrangements made at the
individual enterprise level. These included the requirement that
enterprise-level wage increases reflect efficiency gains made through the
operation of the structural efficiency principle, that the agreement be
negotiated through a single bargaining unit in an enterprise or section of
an enterprise, and that it be for a fixed term. Further, enterprise
agreements were not to involve reductions in ordinary time earnings,
standard hours of work, annual leave, or long service leave as
determined by the awards of the mc. Following the June 1992
amendments to the IRA, the capacity of federal unions to pursue
enterprise agreements that varied the conditions laid down in awards
was placed on a clearer legal footing.93
One major lesson to be drawn from the development of the
Accord process in the 1980s is that it is possible to bring about
substantial reform to the labour market by legal means, but without
resorting to legislative change. Since the outcomes of the compulsory
arbitration process (the awards) are legally enforceable and widereaching, they serve as a form of delegated legislation through which
economic policy may be passed more simply and quickly. This fact has
not been lost on many critics of the Australian system who have noted
that the legislation and awards of Australian industrial relations are not
per se major obstructions to workplace reformY4 However, the award
restructuring process inevitably relies upon the close proximity of
government policy and the policy of the mc, which, as noted earlier, is an
independent statutory authority. When it chooses to exercise its
92 (1991), 39 LR. 127.
93

See above at pp. 286-87.
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See, for example, ac Report, supra note 52.
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independence in a manner contrary to government policy, as it did in the
National Wage Decision of April, 1991, 9 5 then the prospect for
government directed reform is lost. This inevitably places in question
the continuing role of such an institution in the rapidly changing
Australian economic climate. There is no doubt that both the Labor
government and the ACr envisage a considerably reduced independent
role for the national tribunal in the emerging new industrial relations
framework.
It is too soon to draw firm conclusions as to the economic and
industrial benefits arising from the period of award restructuring, which
has taken place since 1987. On balance there is no doubt that it is in this
area, rather than in legislative change, that the most far-reaching
reforms have taken place. 96 There is acknowledged progress across a
wide spread of industries, which has seen the broad-banding of job
classifications, the reduction of many restrictions on the scheduling and
organization of work, and the development of other aspects of an
enterprise focus, including performance-based pay, multi-skilling,
retraining, and so on. However, it is also believed that many of these
innovations are mere changes on paper, and that effective workplace
change inpracticehas come more slowly.9
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a picture of a confused and hesitant
programme for industrial relations reform in Australia. The impression
created by the build-up of developments in the 1980s is that we are on
the verge of a major policy redirection in industrial relations institutions
and practices. However, the point of absolute departure from
compulsory arbitration has not yet been reached, it is obvious that the
groundwork for a major switch in policy has already been laid. There is
95

Supra note 91.
96 For a general survey see R. Mitchell & M. Rimmer, "Labour Law, Deregulation and
Flexibility in Australia Industrial Relations" (1990) 12 Comp. Lab. L.J. 1. However, further
legislative reforms are anticipated in late 1993. These are likely to see a considerably enhanced role
for bargaining and a subtle lessening of the award/compulsory arbitration system. Some guidance in
this area was given in a speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Keating, to the Institute of Company
Directors on 21 April 1992. See, for example, T. Burton, "Keating's ut Revolution," TheAustralian
FinancialReview(22 April 1993).
97
Fora study of the progress of award restructuring, see I Curtain, R. Gough & M. Rimmer,
Progress at the Workplace: An Overview-Workplace Reform and Award Reshucturing (Monash:
National Key Centre in Industrial Relations, Monash University, 1992).

1993]

Australian CompulsoryArbitration

a broad consensus amongst policy makers that Australia's future
depends upon its integration into the international economy, and a
number of economic policy decisions have been made on this
assumption, including the deregulation of the financial sector and the
privatization and de-monopolization of other sectors of the regulated
economy, such as airlines and telecommunications. However,
international surveys seem to indicate that even in the most pressing of
times, radical structural change in established industrial relations
systems occurs infrequently,9" and the Australian position (though not
New Zealand's we should note) seems to be a case in point.
As the paper indicates, it is in the field of award regulation that
the most far-reaching reforms to Australian industrial relations
structures and practices have taken place in the second half of the 1980s.
The process of award restructuring, which has redirected the focus of
industrial relations to enterprise-based performance, flexibility, and
productivity, has been managed within the centralized processes of the
existing system, and there is no doubt that this approach has the support
of most major parties to industrial relations. There is compelling
evidence that managers believe the major obstacles to workplace reform
to be managerial rather than structural in nature, and that the existing
system allows both for flexibility and variety between enterprises. 99
The availability of this process may adequately explain why it has
been unnecessary for the federal government to introduce major
legislative change in the Australian system.100 But the lack of uniform
legislative reform throughout the country is also a measure of some
critical political aspects of Australian industrial relations. Two key
obstructions to legislative reform are apparent. First, the division of
government between federal and state authorities makes coordinated
industrial relations reform problematic, particularly because unions may
opt to switch between federal and state industrial jurisdictions.
Secondly, the system provides an important protective net for the
minimum paid worker and also provides for much of the power base,
authority, and security of the union movement. While there is evidently
a process of slow and incremental reform to the compulsory arbitration
system in progress, it is unlikely that the Am and the union movement
would disown the system to the extent of intentionally facilitating its
98
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immediate abolition. The general direction of the Labor-sponsored
changes, however, continue to place the mc in a compromised position
and to call into question the long term relevance of compulsory
arbitration as a general system.
Clearly, the uncertainty of the political juxtaposition of Labor
and conservative governments, the problems of a constitutionally divided
industrial relations structure, and the relative power of the trade union
movement make any prediction of future trends in legislative change
difficult, to say the least. Assuming that federal Labor remains in office
and committed to continuing its programme of decentralized enterprise
bargaining, it is difficult to see what role envisaged for the mc will justify
the maintenance of such a large and expensive structure. On the other
hand, there is only a remote possibility that Labor is (despite some
recent comments suggesting otherwise) interested in dismantling the
system and erecting some alternative devices for the settlement of
industrial disputes. Nevertheless, one must remember that a federal
government is not compelled by the constitution to legislate under its
head of power at all, and secondly, that section 51 (xxxv)Y0l does not
require the establishment of permanent conciliation and arbitration
tribunals or a system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration. While
there might be some difficulty in the construction of a system based
primarily upon enterprise bargaining, it is unlikely that the terms of the
constitution will be an insuperable barrier.
Assuming that a sudden and absolute systemic break with the
past will not occur under Labor, the most likely scenario is that
legislative change will continue in the present mode. We might expect to
see, for example, further attempts to establish a Labour Court, a revised
set of sanctions, and some provisions securing a (modified) right to
strike in the context of a bargaining system. The award system will
remain an option for those unions lacking the power to exploit the
bargaining system.
There remains, however, the prospect of more radical reform in
the longer term-the abandonment of compulsory arbitration over
disputes and the abolition of the mc. Noting the changed approach by
governments to the Commission's powers and role, commentators have
raised the possibility that the system no longer has a guaranteed position
in Australian economic and industrial relations regulation. Political and
industrial developments following the recent National Wage Decision of
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April 1991102 have confirmed that forecast and confirmed that the
Accord, rather than the mc, is presently the principal institution for
determining the level of macro-wage outcomes and the direction of
industrial relations reform. For reasons outlined earlier, it is most
unlikely that Labor will go beyond this point and undertake a repeal of
the compulsory arbitration system. For its part, the Liberal-National
Party has stated that it is not its intention to abolish the mc. However,
there is no doubt that the developments of the 1980s have created the
conditions wherein such a move is no longer necessarily undesirable or
inconceivable. It would be ironic, indeed, if the developments under the
Labor/Acru Accord 0 3 had created the conditions under which the
arbitration system could be safely politically dismantled.
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